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Abstract
7KLV SDSHU H[DPLQHV WKHLPSDFW RI WKHFXUUHQW :HVWHUQ ¿QDQFLDO VDQFWLRQV RQ
WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ 0RGHOLQJ WKHFDSLWDO ÀRZ FRPSRQHQWV DFFRXQWLQJ IRU WKHLQ
ÀXHQFHRIRWKHUIDFWRUVLQFOXGLQJIDOOLQJRLOSULFHVUHYHDOVWKDWVDQFWLRQVKDYHGLUHFW-
ly affected sanctioned state -controlled banks, oil, gas and arms companies by severely 
constraining foreign funding and have indirectly affected non-sanctioned companies by 
UHGXFLQJLQÀRZVRIIRUHLJQGLUHFWLQYHVWPHQWDQGFDXVLQJIXQGLQJFRQGLWLRQVWRGHWHULR-
UDWH7KHRYHUDOOQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQJURVVFDSLWDOLQÀRZRYHU±LVHVWLPDWHGDW
DSSUR[LPDWHO\EQ+RZHYHU WKHHIIHFWRQQHWFDSLWDO LQÀRZLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\ ORZHU
($160–170bn) due to Russian companies’ self -adjustment, which is evidenced by their 
utili zation of foreign assets accumulated earlier for debt repayment and an overall decrease 
LQJURVVFDSLWDORXWÀRZ7KHVDQFWLRQV¶HVWLPDWHGHIIHFWRQ*'3LVVLJQL¿FDQW±SS
by 2017, compared with a hypothetical scenario with no sanctions) but 3.3 times lower 
than the estimated effects of the oil price shock.
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
reserved.
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ: F32, F37, F47.
Keywords:¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVEDODQFHRISD\PHQWVDGMXVWPHQWH[WHUQDOGHEWFDSLWDOÀRZV
1. Introduction
In March 2014, the EU, the U.S. and a number of other states introduced 
WKH¿UVWVDQFWLRQVDJDLQVW5XVVLDLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHVLWXDWLRQLQWKH&ULPHD
360 (*XUYLFK,3ULOHSVNL\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
DQG HDVWHUQ8NUDLQH$W ¿UVW WKHVHZHUH LQGLYLGXDO VDQFWLRQV DJDLQVW VSHFL¿F
SHRSOH DQG FRPSDQLHV WKDW ZHUH QRW VLJQL¿FDQW WR WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ DV
DZKROH+RZHYHULQ-XO\DGGLWLRQDOVHFWRUDOVDQFWLRQVZHUHLPSRVHGWKDW
OLPLWHG IRUHLJQ ¿QDQFLQJ IRU OHDGLQJ SXEOLF EDQNV DQG RLO DQG JDV FRPSDQLHV
and restricted Russian oil and gas companies’ access to advanced production 
techno logies. In response, Russia imposed an embargo on a wide range of agri-
FXOWXUDOSURGXFWVIURP:HVWHUQFRXQWULHVLQ$XJXVW7RGD\WKHUHVHHPVWR
be no chance of the sanctions being lifted any time soon, although the situation in 
Ukraine has somewhat stabilized: in June 2015, the EU announced the extension 
of the sanctions until at least the end of the year (and in December 2015, they 
were further prolonged until July 31st, 2016 at the very least), while the U.S. ac-
tually expanded the list of companies falling under its sectoral sanctions. In turn, 
Russia prolonged its food embargo for another year.
$OWKRXJK WKHVDQFWLRQV KDYH QRZ EHHQ LQ IRUFH IRU TXLWH VRPH WLPH WKHUH
still has been no convincing evaluation of their effects, and there is no consen-
VXVRQWKHLUTXDOLWDWLYHLPSDFW)RUH[DPSOHVSHDNLQJEHIRUHWKH86&RQJUHVVLQ
-DQXDU\%2EDPDVDLGWKDW³WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\LVLQWDWWHUV´1 although 
VRPH HFRQRPLVWV EHOLHYH WKDW WKHVDQFWLRQV DUH RI OLWWOH RU QR VLJQL¿FDQFH$Q
IMF (2015) report on the Russian economy indicates that the sanctions and retalia-
tory sanctions may lead Russia to experience a reduction in GDP of 1.0%–1.5% 
over the short term, although the accumulated loss may reach 9.0% of GDP over 
WKHPHGLXPWHUP+RZHYHUWKLVUHSRUWIDLOVWRH[SOLFDWHZKDWLVFRQVLGHUHG³VKRUW
WHUP´ DQG ³PHGLXP WHUP´$ 6KLURY HWDO SODFH WKHGLUHFW LPSDFW RI WKHVDQF-
tions between 8% and 10% of Russia’s GDP but posit that compensating measures 
PD\ UHGXFH WKLV ¿JXUH VLJQL¿FDQWO\+RZHYHU WKH6KLURY VWXG\ GRHV QRW H[SOL-




assessed rather tentatively: these authors assumed only that Russia’s private sector 
lost all access to the foreign capital markets. Rautava (2014) and Vercueil (2014) 
FRQVLGHU WKHRYHUDOO HIIHFWV RI WKHXQFHUWDLQW\ DVVRFLDWHGZLWK8NUDLQH7KH¿UVW
study (published before the sectoral sanctions were adopted) estimated the impact 
as a 1 p.p. reduction in the 2014 GDP growth rate (Rautava, 2014). The second 
VWXG\LQGLFDWHVWKDWLQD³GHHVFDODWLRQ´VFHQDULRLQZKLFK¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVZHUH
gradually lifted, GDP would grow an additional 2 p.p. in 2015 than it would un-
GHUWKHVFHQDULRRIDVWDQGLQJFRQÀLFWLQHDVWHUQ8NUDLQH+RZHYHUQRPHWKRGRI
HYDOXDWLQJWKLVHIIHFWZDVFLWHG%RXODQJHUHWDOFRQVLGHUHGRQO\WKHLPSDFW
of Russia’s retaliatory sanctions on public welfare: based on their static model, 
the authors  estimated a reduction of 0.25%.
7KLV SDSHU DLPV WR VWXG\ WKH¿QDQFLDO FKDQQHO RI WKHVDQFWLRQV¶ LPSDFW RQ
WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\WKDWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKOLPLWVRQIRUHLJQERUURZLQJ$VDUH-






ties in the private sector decreased by USD 37 billion, which sharply contrasted 
ZLWKDQLQFUHDVHRI86'ELOOLRQLQ$QLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHRIWKLVGURSLV
WKDWFDSLWDOÀRZUHYHUVDOVW\SLFDOO\RFFXUDVDUHVXOWRIGHFLVLRQVPDGHE\LQYHV-
tors that are driven by economic logic, whereas in this case, the drop occurred 
due to administrative restrictions.
First, we evaluate the impact of the sanctions on the basic components of 
WKH¿QDQFLDO DFFRXQW DQG FDOFXODWH KRZ VDQFWLRQV LQÀXHQFH WKHQHW RXWÀRZ RI
capital from Russia. Then, we conduct a scenario analysis (for the medium term) 
RIWKHLPSDFWRIDGGLWLRQDOFDSLWDORXWÀRZRQFHUWDLQPDFURHFRQRPLFDQG¿VFDO
indicators. 
We assume that there are only limited effects over the medium term with respect 
to oil and gas sanctions (due to reduced production) and technological sanctions 
(due to slower productivity growth caused by problems with importing dual-use 
SURGXFWV7KXVWKHFKDQJHVLQFDSLWDOÀRZVDQGWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJDGMXVWPHQWV
LQEDODQFHRISD\PHQWVFRQVLGHUHGLQWKLVSDSHUDUHOLNHO\WREHWKHPRVWVLJQL¿-
FDQW FRQVHTXHQFHVRI WKHVDQFWLRQV LQ WKHIRUHVHHDEOH IXWXUH7KHSUHYDOHQFHRI
WKH¿QDQFLDO HIIHFWV RI WKHVDQFWLRQV GXULQJ WKH¿UVW \HDUV UHVXOWLQJ LQ UHGXFHG
investment and consumption, is also noted in other works (IMF, 2015; Sinyakov 
et al., 2015; Shirov et al., 2015). Unlike these studies, our research presents a more 
detailed analysis of the impact of sanctions on basic macroeconomic indicators as 
well as on the components of the balance of payments.
*HQHUDODSSURDFKWRHYDOXDWLQJWKHLPSDFWRIVDQFWLRQVRQFDSLWDOÀRZV
7KHVDQFWLRQVZHUHPRVWO\GLUHFWHGDWEDQNV6EHUEDQN97%*D]SURPEDQN
5RVVHONKR]EDQN 9QHVKHNRQRPEDQN %DQN RI 0RVFRZ DQG PDMRU SXEOLFO\
owned companies in the fuel/energy sector (Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft) 




there are the more severe SDN sanctions that prohibit foreign exchange payments 
(affecting banks and companies whose owners were subjected to personal sanc-
tions). Second, many Russian banks are affected by the so-called “soft” sanc-
tions, which means stricter technical control over transactions that typically slows 
GRZQWKHLUH[HFXWLRQWKHUHE\VLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVLQJWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV
7KHPDLQ FKDQQHOV RI WKHVDQFWLRQV¶ LQÀXHQFH RQ WKHUHDO VHFWRU WKHQH[W
“stage” of their impact on the economy) are considered by Ulyukaev and Mau 
7KHLUFODVVL¿FDWLRQLQFOXGHVWKHIROORZLQJFRPSRQHQWV
x Increasing uncertainty (beginning even before the sectoral sanctions were in-
troduced) slows down consumption due to rising precautionary savings (often 
in USD) and dwindling investments due to higher risk premiums; 
x ,QFUHDVHGFRVWRIGHEW¿QDQFLQJOLPLWVDFFHVVWRUH¿QDQFLQJWKHUHE\DIIHFWLQJ
investment opportunities for companies. Moreover, restrictions on technology 
exports to the Russian Federation constrain the potential growth of total factor 
productivity; and
x Production in sectors dependent on imported components suffers from the ruble ’s 
sharp fall.
362 (*XUYLFK,3ULOHSVNL\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
7KHHIIHFWV RI WKH¿QDQFLDO VDQFWLRQV ZHUH PDJQL¿HG EHFDXVH WKH5XVVLDQ
¿QDQFLDO V\VWHP ZDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ RSHQLQJ XS DQG JUDGXDOO\ LQWHJUDWLQJ LQWR




3% and 6% of GDP. 




of Russia, 12% of the total amount consisted of short-term debt that was to be 
repaid within a year, with over 25% of such debt in the banking sector. Notably, 
at that moment, the assets accumulated by Russian economic agents exceeded 
OLDELOLWLHVE\+RZHYHUWKHDVVHWVDQGOLDELOLWLHVZHUHGLIIHUHQWLDOO\GLVWULEX
ted among the various sectors: banks and the public sector had positive net assets 
86'ELOOLRQDQG86'ELOOLRQUHVSHFWLYHO\ZKHUHDVWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDO
sector had negative net assets (–USD 318 billion).
7KLVSDSHUFRQVLGHUVRQO\WKHHIIHFWVRIWKH¿UVWJURXSRIVDQFWLRQV²WKH¿QDQ
FLDOVDQFWLRQV²DVWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQW&RQFXUUHQWO\IXUWKHUDQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDW
restrictions on credit to Russian borrowers are having substantial additional im-
plications that should also be taken into account to evaluate the full effect of 
WKHVDQFWLRQV:HRIIHUWKHIROORZLQJFODVVL¿FDWLRQRIWKHHIIHFWVRIWKH¿QDQFLDO
sanctions.
Direct effects mean restrictions placed on the foreign borrowings of Russian 
LVVXHUV,QWKHRU\5XVVLDQEDQNVDQGFRPSDQLHVFDQ¿QGDOWHUQDWLYHFUHGLWRUVEXW
WKLVRSWLRQLV OLPLWHGLQSUDFWLFHDVDUHVXOWRI WKHJOREDOL]DWLRQRI WKH¿QDQFLDO
Table 1
%DODQFHRIIRUHLJQDVVHWVDQGOLDELOLWLHVDFURVVYDULRXVVHFWRUVRIWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\86'ELOOLRQ




Including foreign debt 733
Including short-term 86
General government and the Central Bank 472
$VVHWV 548
Liabilities 76














system, which has actually become a single marketplace. For example, the likeli-
KRRGRI UHGLUHFWLQJERUURZLQJV WR WKH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV RI(DVW DQG6RXWKHDVW
$VLDLVORZGXHWRWKHZHDNVWDUWLQJSRVLWLRQVRI5XVVLDQERUURZHUVLQ$VLDQPDU-
NHWVLQDGGLWLRQWR$VLDQLQYHVWRUV¶FRQFHUQVDERXWSRVVLEOHQHJDWLYHUHDFWLRQV
from U.S. regulators. 
Indirect effects. The persistent geopolitical tension, the potential for new sanc-
tions or an expanded interpretation of existing sanctions by U.S. and EU regu-
lators, in addition to the chance that Russia will impose changes to the “rules 
of the game” (e.g., restrictions on capital transactions) are viewed by investors 
as an important source of additional economic risk. Thus, the attractiveness of 




issuers that are subject to the sanctions, the indirect effects have more compo-
QHQWVUHGXFHGERUURZLQJVIRUDOORWKHULVVXHUVDGHFUHDVHGLQÀRZRIIRUHLJQGL-
UHFWDQGSRUWIROLRLQYHVWPHQWDQGSRVVLEO\LQFUHDVHGRXWÀRZRI5XVVLDQFDSLWDO
Reaction to the sanctions. The direct and indirect effects that prevent foreign 
GHEWIURPEHLQJUH¿QDQFHGDUHGLIIHUHQWIURPRWKHUHIIHFWVGXHWRWKHLUSHUVRQDOL
]HGQDWXUHLHWKH\DIIHFWVSHFL¿FLVVXHUVDVZHOODVWKHHFRQRP\DVDZKROH
The “affected” issuers can react to the sanctions in a number of ways, ranging 
from buying in domestic foreign exchange market funds to repay the debt, to sell-
LQJDFFXPXODWHGIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHDVVHWVLQDQDPRXQWWKDWLVVXI¿FLHQWWRPDNH
IRUHLJQGHEWSD\PHQWV$VVKRZQLQRXUIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVHDFKRIWKHVHDUHDVSOD\V
an important role in determining the overall estimated effects of the sanctions.
Second-order effects involve changes in key macroeconomic indicators (ex-
change rates, prices, exports and imports, etc.) in response to reduced net capi-
WDOLQÀRZ6XFKDVKRFNVKRXOGEHIROORZHGE\DQDGMXVWPHQWLQWKHEDODQFHRI
payments by means of a combination of an increase in the current account and 
WKHVSHQGLQJRI);UHVHUYHVE\WKH&HQWUDO%DQN7KHPHFKDQLVPVIRUWKHVHDG-
justments were considered by Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2013), who note, in par-
WLFXODUWKDWFDSLWDOLQÀRZLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVGHSHQGVPRVWO\RQLWVIRUHLJQ
supply rather than on domestic demand. 
7KHLPSDFW RI WKHVDQFWLRQV FDQQRW DOZD\V EH GH¿QLWLYHO\ GHFRPSRVHG LQWR
the aforementioned channels. For example, it is clear that a sharp decrease in 
WKHGHEWOLDELOLWLHVRIEDQNVQRWVSHFL¿FDOO\WDUJHWHGE\WKHVDQFWLRQVFDQEHH[-
SODLQHG DV DQ LQGLUHFW HIIHFW +RZHYHU DVLPLODU UHGXFWLRQ LQ WKHOLDELOLWLHV RI
banks on the sanction list may be caused by both direct and indirect effects, i.e., 
the unwillingness of countries that did not impose sanctions to lend to them due 
to their concerns about the potential negative reactions by U.S. and EU regu-







the amount of foreign debt securities and public banks’ syndicated loans was re-
364 (*XUYLFK,3ULOHSVNL\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
duced by USD 11.2 billion during the second half of 20142. This result demon-
strates that those banks and companies affected by the sanctions were, to a great 
H[WHQWIRUFHGWRIRUHJRUH¿QDQFLQJWKHLUIRUHLJQOLDELOLWLHV
+RZHYHUWKHGLUHFWHIIHFWDORQHFDQQRWDFFRXQWIRUWKHVKDUSGHFUHDVHLQJURVV
FDSLWDO LQÀRZV LQWR WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\7KXV WKHDPRXQW RI IRUHLJQ OLDELOL-




creased by more than USD 15 billion despite the fact that the major companies 
affected by the sanctions (e.g., Rosneft and Gazpromneft) had no foreign debt 
securities to be repaid during that period. 
0RUHRYHU DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH%DQN RI 5XVVLD GXULQJ WKHVHFRQG KDOI RI
 WKHIRUHLJQ GHEW RI WKHEDQNLQJ DQG QRQ¿QDQFLDO VHFWRUV GHFUHDVHG E\
USD 83.6 billion and that of banks and companies that were more than 50% 
publicly owned fell by USD 41.1 billion (without considering liabilities to direct 
LQYHVWRUV$OWKRXJKWKH%DQNRI5XVVLDGRHVQRWSURYLGHLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJ
the contribution of transactions and FX revaluation to changes in  foreign debt by 
SULYDWHDQGSXEOLFFRPSDQLHVVHSDUDWHO\ZHFDQFRQFOXGHWKDWRQDTXDOLWDWLYH
basis, the effect for private banks and companies (those not directly affected by 
the sanctions) is at least comparable to that for public companies, even if only 
GHEWREOLJDWLRQVDUHFRXQWHG7KXVZHVWUHVV WKHKLJKVLJQL¿FDQFHRI WKHRWKHU
channels of the sanctions’ impact, which include, in particular, the decreased 
DYDLODELOLW\RIERUURZLQJRSWLRQV IRU WKHSULYDWHVHFWRUDVDZKROH$VDUHVXOW
WKHVKDUH RI UH¿QDQFLQJ IRU IRUHLJQ OLDELOLWLHV KDV GHFUHDVHG VLJQL¿FDQWO\$V
VKRZQLQ7DEOHGXULQJWKHODVWIHZTXDUWHUVWKLVVKDUHKDVEHHQFRQVLGHUDE
O\ ORZHU WKDQ KLVWRULFDO LQGLFDWRUV IRU ERWK WKHEDQNLQJ DQG QRQ¿QDQFLDO VHF-
WRUVWKH³WURXJK´IRUWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUZDVUHDFKHGGXULQJWKH¿UVWTXDUWHU
of 2015 against the background of generally increasing uncertainty concerning 
the prospects for the Russian economy related to falling oil prices, and this rate 
remains close to zero for the banking sector. 
Notably, indirect reactions to the sanctions include reduced gross capital in-





approximately 1/5 of the foreign debt of Russian issuers is denominated in rubles).
Table 2
Repayment of foreign loans by banks subject to sanctions during the second half of 2014 (USD billion).
%DQN Debt securities Syndicated loans Total
Sberbank 0.9 4.2 5.1
97% 0.1 3.1 3.2
Gazprombank 1.7 1.2 2.9












Russia’s sovereign rating, which was likely to have automatically led to sales of 
securities by many institutional investors.
$SDUWIURPWKHHIIHFWVUHODWHGWRFKDQJHVLQWKHEHKDYLRURIHFRQRPLFDJHQWV
investing in Russian assets, the sanctions also resulted in changes to the deci-
sions made by Russian banks and companies regarding investment in foreign 
assets, i.e., in an active reaction. This effect was most noticeable during the third 
TXDUWHU RI  ZKHQ WKHEDQNLQJ VHFWRU UHGXFHG LWV IRUHLJQ DVVHW KROGLQJV
by USD 29.9 billion in anticipation of major foreign debt repayments during 
WKHIRXUWKTXDUWHUE\FRPSDULVRQDQDYHUDJHRI86'ELOOLRQLQDVVHWVZDV
DFFXPXODWHGEHWZHHQ WKHVHFRQG DQG IRXUWKTXDUWHUV RI $VLPLODU WUHQG
ZDVREVHUYHGLQWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUEHJLQQLQJLQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURI




7KHRYHUYLHZ RI WKHFKDQJHV LQ FDSLWDO ÀRZV IROORZLQJ WKHLPSRVLWLRQ RI
VDQFWLRQVLVSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOHZKLFKFRQWDLQV¿QDQFLDODFFRXQWLQGLFDWRUVIRU
WKHIRXUTXDUWHUVRIWKHVDQFWLRQVLH WKHVHFRQGKDOIRIDQG¿UVWKDOIRI
20153), as well as for similar periods from preceding years. These data show 
DQ LQFUHDVH LQ QHW FDSLWDO RXWÀRZ IURP5XVVLD DIWHU VDQFWLRQV ZHUH LPSRVHG
%RUURZLQJDQGIRUHLJQGLUHFWLQYHVWPHQWZHUHUHGXFHGWKHPRVW
+RZHYHUDOORIWKHREVHUYHGFKDQJHVLQFDSLWDOÀRZVFDQQRWEHDWWULEXWHGWR
the effects of the sanctions. The magnitude of these changes depends on many 




2Q 2015 5 98
1Q 2015 7 60
4Q 2014 19 74






a The change in foreign debt from transactions, divided by anticipated foreign debt repayments (from 
WKHVFKHGXOHSXEOLVKHGE\WKH%DQNRI5XVVLD
b &KDQJHVLQWKHFDSLWDOLQÀRZGXULQJWKH¿UVWTXDUWHURIZHUHSULPDULO\FDXVHGE\WKHGHDOEHWZHHQ%3
and Rosneft and are not included in the calculations for this reason.
Source: DXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQ%DQNRI5XVVLDGDWD
366 (*XUYLFK,3ULOHSVNL\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
factors, such as export revenues (most importantly) as well as the exchange rate, 
interest rates, investment demand, etc. Next, we examine the basic factors that 
must be taken into account in evaluating the effects of the sanctions: 
x 7KHFRQVLGHUDEOH LPSDFW RQ FDSLWDO ÀRZV GXULQJ WKHSHULRG VLQFH WKHWKLUG
TXDUWHURIZDVFDXVHGQRWRQO\E\UHVWULFWLRQVRQIRUHLJQ¿QDQFLQJEXW
also by falling oil prices and the associated revised forecasts of the prospects 
and investment attractiveness of the Russian economy; 
x $VLJQL¿FDQWSRUWLRQRIUHJLVWHUHGFDSLWDOÀRZVDSSUR[LPDWHO\DFFRUGLQJ








]HG E\ KLJK TXDUWHUO\ YRODWLOLW\ HJ VLQFH WKH± FULVLV²DQG HYHQ
EHIRUH WKHVDQFWLRQV²WKHVWDQGDUG GHYLDWLRQV IRU ERWK JURVV LQÀRZV DQG RXW-
ÀRZVZHUHDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKHLUPHDQYDOXHV7KLVYRODWLOLW\FDQQRWEH
explained by changes in the variables generally used in the models by leading 
H[SHUWRUJDQL]DWLRQVVXFKDVWKH,0)1LHUHWDO(&%)UDW]VFKHU
RU,,).RHSNH¿UVWWKHGLIIHUHQWLDOEHWZHHQLQWHUHVWUDWHVLQ5XVVLDDQG
those in developed countries and, second, the VIX volatility index calculated by 
WKH&KLFDJR%RDUG2SWLRQV([FKDQJH
Thus, to correctly evaluate the effects of the sanctions, we must distinguish 
between their effects and those of other factors. The general approach applied 
LQ WKLV SDSHU LV DV IROORZV )RU WKHPDLQ FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH¿QDQFLDO DFFRXQW
ZHFDOFXODWHG³QRUPDO´YDOXHVRIFDSLWDOLQÀRZDQGRXWÀRZGXULQJWKHVDQFWLRQ
Table 4
Certain components of the balance of payments (USD billion).
Sector July 2010 – 
June 2011
July 2011 –  
June 2012
July 2012 –  
June 2013
July 2013 –  
June 2014
July 2014 –  
June 2015
General government 3.5 8.1 13.8 1.5 –9.9
Liabilities 3.5 8.1 13.8 1.5 –9.9
Banks 1.8 5.0 –13.7 –19.2 –8.5
Debt liabilities 31.6 24.3 33.8 0.1 –37.3
$VVHWV –29.8 –19.3 –47.5 –19.3 28.8
Other sectors (without cash 
foreign currency)
–14.9 –2.9 –23.2 –1.0 –55.8
Direct investment –16.8 –19.2 –18.2 –12.6 –35.7
Liabilities 45.6 38.3 70.6 39.3 2.2
$VVHWV –62.3 –57.5 –88.8 –51.9 –37.9
Loans 1.8 16.3 41.4 11.5 –20.2
Liabilities 1.8 16.3 41.4 11.5 –20.2
Cash foreign currency 6.7 0.2 4.0 –17.2 –10.9
Total –3.0 10.5 27.2 –36.0 –85.1
Liabilities 82.5 87.0 159.6 52.5 –65.1




period, which means that we calculated values that might have been observed 
without the sanctions but with the actual values of the rest of the exogenous in-




determining the estimated effects because the combination of sanctions, falling 
RLOSULFHVDQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHOHGWRSDQLFLQWKH);PDU-
NHWGXULQJWKDWSHULRGSDUWLFXODUO\LQ'HFHPEHU$VDUHVXOWWKHH[FKDQJHUDWH
was not consistent with the fundamentals (i.e., a clear overshooting occurred), 
ZKLFKZDVFRQ¿UPHGE\WKHHQVXLQJUHERXQGLQWKHH[FKDQJHUDWH7KLVHIIHFWLQ
turn, had a positive feedback with the demand for foreign exchange cash, lead-
LQJWRH[FHVVLYHFDSLWDORXWÀRZ²HYHQZKHQWDNLQJWKHVDQFWLRQVLQWRDFFRXQW
In other words, the situation at the end of 2014 was caused not only (and not to 
the greatest extent) by the combination of objectively measured economic factors 
DQGVDQFWLRQVEXWDOVRE\WKHSDQLFWKDWGH¿HVDQ\DWWHPSWVDWPRGHOLQJ
In the end, for purposes of evaluating the effects for 2014 (more precisely, 
IRU WKHVHFRQG KDOI RI  ZH XVHG GDWD FDOFXODWHG IRU WKHWKLUG TXDUWHU RI
2014, whereas the simulations for 2015 through 2017 were based on the calcu-
lated values of deviation for the components of the balance of payments from 
WKH³QRUP´LQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURIDQGWKH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGTXDUWHUVRI
,QIDFWWKRVHSHULRGVUHÀHFWGLIIHUHQWH[WHUQDOFRQGLWLRQVWKHFRQWLQXHGKLJKRLO
prices (3Q 2014), the passing of the price “trough”, the very high uncertainty re-











this manner offer only a general view of the extent of the sanctions’ effects.
7KHVFHQDULRDQDO\VLVRIWKHLPSDFWRIVDQFWLRQVRQPDFURHFRQRPLFDQG¿VFDO
indicators, which is to be performed in the second stage, must consider that the ef-
fects of the sanctions immediately lead to deviations from the “normal”  trajectory 
RIWKHPDFURHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUV)RUH[DPSOHWKHLQDELOLW\WRUH¿QDQFHIRUHLJQ
GHEWZLOOOHDGDWHYHU\VWDJHWKHXQLWRIWLPHLVRQHTXDUWHUWRDUHGXFWLRQLQLWV
value compared with the hypothetical “normal” scenario. For this reason, we built 
WZRYHUVLRQVRIWKHIRUHFDVW7KH¿UVWWKH³EDVHOLQH´SURYLGHVDVWHSE\VWHSGH-
scription of the potential development trajectory without the sanctions and assum-
ing continuously high oil prices (at USD 100 per barrel). In the second version, at 
every step, the foreign capital not received as a result of the sanctions is deducted. 
The macroeconomic indicators are then found for the next step, the capital not re-
ceived is again calculated and deducted, etc. Comparing the indicators for the two 
versions provides an evaluation of the sanctions’ effects. 
368 (*XUYLFK,3ULOHSVNL\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
We also consider two additional scenarios that are characterized by reduced 
oil prices (between USD 50 and USD 53 per barrel) and that correspond to 
WKH0LQLVWU\ RI (FRQRPLF 'HYHORSPHQW IRUHFDVW GDWHG 2FWREHU  4 
Considering these scenarios enables us to evaluate the effects of falling oil prices 
and the sanctions separately, with high and low oil prices. Thus, we can under-
stand whether any synergy occurs when the two negative factors are combined, 
or if their effects are just added to one another.
$TXDQWLWDWLYHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHVDQFWLRQV¶HIIHFWVRQFDSLWDOÀRZV
1H[WZHZLOO HYDOXDWH WKHHIIHFWV RI VDQFWLRQV RQ WKH¿QDQFLDO DFFRXQW$V
)LJVKRZVWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIWKHVDQFWLRQVOHGWRDTXDOLWDWLYHFKDQJHLQFDSLWDO
ÀRZV WKHJURVV LQÀRZ EHFDPH SHUVLVWHQWO\ QHJDWLYH IRU WKH¿UVW WLPH VLQFH
WKH±FULVLVUHÀHFWLQJWKHVDQFWLRQV¶GLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFWVZKHUH-
DVJURVVRXWÀRZVGHFUHDVHGVKDUSO\5UHÀHFWLQJ5XVVLDQLQYHVWRUV¶UHDFWLRQ
We now consider each of the separate components of the balance of payments 
under the sanctions.
3.1. Changes in debt liabilities
To determine the impact of the sanctions on foreign debt liabilities, we used 
WKHLQGLFDWRUV RI IRUHLJQ GHEW UH¿QDQFLQJ IURP7DEOH ZKLFK VKRZ WKDW LW LV
gra dually decreasing. We believe that this trend can be explained by the reduc-
tion in investment demand under conditions of decreasing (see Fig. 2) expected 











RXVGHEWZDVUH¿QDQFHG LQ IXOODQGQHZGHEWZDVDGGHG WKDWHTXDOHGRI
the previous debt. 
,Q DFFRUGDQFHZLWK WKHDERYH DSSURDFK WKHVKDUH RI UH¿QDQFLQJ RI IRUHLJQ
debt under the sanctions was calculated as an average indicator for the sanction 
SHULRG H[FOXGLQJ WKHIRXUWK TXDUWHU RI  7KHUHVXOWLQJ UH¿QDQFLQJ VKDUHV
DUHIRUEDQNVDQGIRUWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRU7KXVWKHHIIHFWGXHWR
WKHVDQFWLRQVKDV WZRFRPSRQHQWV¿UVW5XVVLDQERUURZHUVFDQRQO\ UH¿QDQFH
their foreign debt partially rather than in full (as before) and, second, Russian 
ERUURZHUVFDQQRWVHFXUHDGGLWLRQDOORDQVEH\RQGWKHLUUH¿QDQFLQJUHTXLUHPHQWV
$SUHOLPLQDU\HYDOXDWLRQRIWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURIEDVHGRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQ




To evaluate the effects of the sanctions in this area, we applied the calculated 
LQGLFDWRUVRIUH¿QDQFLQJWRWKHIRUHLJQGHEWUHSD\PHQWVFKHGXOHWKDWLVSXEOLVKHG
E\WKH%DQNRI5XVVLD)RUWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIZHXVHGGDWDDVRI-XO\
IRU VXEVHTXHQW \HDUV ZH XVHG GDWD DV RI -DQXDU\ 6$V DUHVXOW WKH¿UVW
component of the effect of sanctions (reduced foreign borrowing) is evaluated 
at approximately USD 60 billion in annual terms. The majority of this amount 
(USD 44.3 billion) consists of borrowings by banks, while the losses in the non-
¿QDQFLDO VHFWRU DUH RQO\86'  ELOOLRQ LH VOLJKWO\PRUH WKDQ RQHIRXUWK
RIWKHWRWDO$FRPSDULVRQRIWKHDFWXDODQGK\SRWKHWLFDOZLWKRXWWKHVDQFWLRQV
trends of foreign borrowing is presented in Fig. 3.
:LWKUHJDUGWRRWKHUFRPSRQHQWVRIWKH¿QDQFLDODFFRXQWZHXVHGDVRPHZKDW
GLIIHUHQWPHWKRGRIDQDO\VLV7RREWDLQ³QRUPDO´LQGLFDWRUVRIFDSLWDOLQÀRZDQG
 6 For 2017, we estimate debt repayments by applying the average maturity estimated on the data for 2015–2016.






on oil prices, GDP, expected economic growth rates, etc. It should be noted that 
VLPXODWLRQVRYHUWKHVKRUWWHUPUHGXFHWKHSUHFLVLRQRIWKHHVWLPDWHV+RZHYHU
LQ RXU RSLQLRQ WKLV DSSURDFK LV MXVWL¿HG EHFDXVH RI WKHTXDOLWDWLYH FKDQJH LQ
PRQHWDU\SROLF\E\ WKH%DQNRI5XVVLDZKLFKSXUVXHG DJUDGXDO WUDQVLWLRQ WR
LQÀDWLRQ WDUJHWLQJDQGDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWH7KLVSROLF\VKLIW LQSDUWLFXODU
GLVFRXUDJHGWKHLQÀRZRIVKRUWWHUPFDSLWDOGXULQJWKHSRVWFULVLVSHULRGGXHWR




fdi_in = 7,17  +  0,289 gdp_g(–1)  +  0,705 gdp_gf   +  25,8 d_2013q1 (1)
 (5,15) (2,18) (1,94) (36,4)
7KHGLUHFW LQYHVWPHQW LQÀRZ fdi_in was determined based on the economic 
development prospects that we characterized using IMF growth forecasts for 
the current year (gdp_gf  WKDWDUHSXEOLVKHGRQDTXDUWHUO\EDVLV-DQXDU\$SULO
-XO\2FWREHUDQGODJJHG*'3JURZWKUDWHVgdp_g (–1), or the year preceding 
WKHFXUUHQWTXDUWHU7KHGXPP\YDULDEOHd_2013q1 was added to take into ac-
FRXQWWKHFRORVVDO%35RVQHIWWUDQVDFWLRQPHQWLRQHGDERYH
7KHPRGHOLQJ UHVXOWV DUH SUHVHQWHG LQ )LJ  7KHDFWXDO LQÀRZZDV EHORZ
³QRUPDO´E\86'ELOOLRQLQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURIDQGE\DQDYHUDJHRI
86'ELOOLRQLQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURIDQGLQWKH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGTXDUWHUV















p_in = –3,55  +  1,16 gdpsa_g(–1)  +  2,36 d_q1 (2)
 (–4,92) (2,57) (3,23)
7KHUHVXOWLQJIRUHFDVWVHH)LJVKRZVWKDWWKHDFWXDOLQÀRZRISRUWIROLR






 86'  ELOOLRQ ORZHU WKDQ SUHGLFWHG GXULQJ WKH¿UVW TXDUWHU RI 
DQG86'ELOOLRQKLJKHUWKDQLQWKHVHFRQGTXDUWHURIWKHODVWTXDU-
ter for which report data are available). The average estimate is low in terms 
of absolute value; in fact, we consider this component of the overall effect of 
WKHVDQFWLRQVWREHLQVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP]HURDQGH[FOXGHLWIURPIXU-
ther calculations.
3.4. Changes in the foreign liabilities of the public sector
This indicator is relatively stable when measured as a percentage of GDP. 
)URPWKURXJKWKHFDSLWDOLQÀRZWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWERQGPDUNHWDYH
UDJHGRI*'3SHUTXDUWHU




see Fig. 6), which appears to have been caused by the downgrading of Russia’s 
VRYHUHLJQUDWLQJE\6WDQGDUGDQG3RRU¶V$OWKRXJKWKHUHYLVLRQRIWKHUDWLQJZDV
also caused by the sanctions against Russia, the main factor is most likely the drop 
LQRLOSULFHVZKLFKLVSDUWLDOO\FRQ¿UPHGE\WKHFDOFXODWLRQVEHORZZKRVHUHVXOWV




This component of the balance of payments is determined mainly by GDP in 
U.S. dollar terms: 
fdi_out / gdp_doll = 0,0275  +  0,109d_2013q1 (4)
 (8,79) (8,70)
Fig. 6. Portfolio Investment in Russian government bonds (USD billion).
Source: $XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQGDWDIURP%DQNRI5XVVLD
373(*XUYLFK,3ULOHSVNL\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
7KHRXWÀRZZDV 86'  ELOOLRQ ORZHU WKDQ SUHGLFWHG LQ WKHWKLUG TXDUWHU





ment, probably through the channel of foreign investment by oil and gas companies:
p_out  =  –2,08  +  0,026 urals (5)
 (–1,94) (2,22)










3.7. Changes in assets in the form of cash foreign currency
7KHIROORZLQJHTXDWLRQGHVFULEHVGHPDQGIRUIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHcash changes, 
depending on the nominal exchange rate of the U.S. dollar (the er variable). 
cash  =  –0,141  +  0,598 cash(–1)  +  32,1(er/er(–1) –1) (6)
 (0,207) (3,13) (1,82)
When estimating the effects of the sanctions in this case, it should be noted 
WKDWKRXVHKROGVEHJDQWREX\IRUHLJQFXUUHQF\FDVKDVHDUO\DVLQWKH¿UVWKDOI
of 2014, due to the escalation of tensions in Ukraine and the pressure on the ru-
EOHIURPWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRITXDQWLWDWLYHHDVLQJE\WKH86)HGHUDO5HVHUYH$V
a result, the increase in the respective assets was considerably higher than pre-
GLFWHG VHH)LJDQG WKHVDQFWLRQV LPSRVHG LQ WKHWKLUGTXDUWHUGLGQRW OHDG
WRDGGLWLRQDODFFHOHUDWLRQ2QDYHUDJHIRUWKUHHTXDUWHUVRIDFFXPXODWHG
 foreign exchange cash was USD 4 billion higher than predicted. The valuations 
IRUWKH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGTXDUWHUVRIDUHQRWVXI¿FLHQWO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHLQWKLV
FDVHEHFDXVHWKH\ODUJHO\UHÀHFWWKHUHERXQGDIWHUWKHIRUHLJQFXUUHQF\SXUFKDVHV
FDXVHG E\ WKHSDQLF GXULQJ WKHIRXUWK TXDUWHU RI  WKHUHERXQG FRQWLQXHG
LQWRWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURI'XHWRWKHLQVXI¿FLHQF\RIGDWDXVHGWRVLPXODWH
the period from 2015 through 2017, we do not include the effects of the sanctions 
in the form of increased foreign currency purchases for this period.
 2WKHUDVVHWV
In our opinion, the trends for the other assets of the private sector (which in-
FOXGHWKH³JUH\´RXWÀRZUHÀHFWPRVWO\WKHUHDFWLRQE\5XVVLDQEDQNVDQGFRP-
panies to the sanctions. Thus, with respect to the banking sector, these assets de-
FUHDVHGE\86'ELOOLRQEHJLQQLQJLQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURIZKLFKLVFORVH
WR WKHDPRXQW RI WKHSD\PHQWV XQGHU WKHXQUH¿QDQFHG GHEW GXULQJ WKHSHULRG
86'ELOOLRQ+RZHYHUWKHTXDUWHUO\G\QDPLFVZHUHTXLWHYRODWLOH7KHVHDV-
VHWVGHFUHDVHGGXULQJWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURIIRUWKHPRVWSDUWZKLFKZDVSRV-





simulation, we ignored this volatility and simply assumed that the foreign assets 
RIWKHEDQNLQJV\VWHPGHFUHDVHE\WKHYDOXHRIWKHXQUH¿QDQFHGGHEWWKHEDQNV




WLRQV ZKHUHDV WKURXJKRXW WKHSHULRG IURP  WKURXJK  WKHRXWÀRZ RI
Russian capital through this channel averaged 9.6% of goods and services ex-





trend and the secondary effects of the sanctions, we assumed that the accumula-
tion of other assets in our estimates decreases regardless of the sanctions. Thus, 
ZHFRQVLGHUWKHVHFRQGDU\HIIHFWVIRUWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUWREH]HURZKLFK
might result in slightly overestimating the overall impact of the sanctions. 
3.9. Overall effect for 2014 and the sanction year 
In Table 5 and Table 6, we sum up the estimated effects of the sanctions on 
WKH¿QDQFLDODFFRXQWFRPSRQHQWVIRUDQGWKHVDQFWLRQ\HDU7KHHVWLPDWHV
for direct investment and public sector liabilities were simply multiplied by four 
to put them into annual terms. We derived estimates for debt liabilities for 2014 
EDVHGRQWKHUH¿QDQFLQJOHYHOLQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHUDQGWKHGHEWUHSD\PHQWVFKHGXOH
IRUWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIVXEVHTXHQWO\GRXEOLQJWKHPIRUWKHVHFRQGKDOIRI
WKHVDQFWLRQ\HDUZHXVHG DFWXDO UH¿QDQFLQJ VKDUHV7KHGHFUHDVH LQEDQN DV-
VHWDFFXPXODWLRQZDVFDOFXODWHGDVWKHIXQGVUHTXLUHGWRUHSD\WKHXQUH¿QDQFHG
Fig. 10. 2WKHUDVVHWVLQFUHDVH86'ELOOLRQ




debt. In terms of foreign exchange cash, we also considered the effects of the un-
FHUWDLQW\GXULQJWKH¿UVWKDOIRI





Sector 3Q 2014 Calculated value 
for 3Q 2014
Estimated effect 
of the sanctions 
(in annual terms)
Federal government –3.9 2.3 –24.8
 Liabilities –3.9 2.3 –24.8
$VVHWV    
Banks 21.7 2.6 –12.2
Liabilities –8.2 3.7 –38.9
$VVHWV 29.9 –1.1 26.7
Other sectors (without cash 
foreign currency)
–15.3 0.9 –63.0
Direct investment –12.6 –6.6 –24.0
Liabilities –1.1 7.7 –35.2
$VVHWV –11.7 –14.3 10.4
Loans –2.7 7.5 –39.1
Liabilities –2.7 7.5 –39.1
Cash foreign currency –1.8 –1.7 –16.0
Total 0.7 4.1 –116.8
Liabilities –15.9 21.2 –138.0










for the above 
TXDUWHUV
Estimated effects 
of the sanctions 
during 
the sanction year
Federal government –3.1 1.7 –12.4
 Liabilities –3.1 1.7 –12.4
$VVHWV    
Banks 3.6 1.5 –10.0
Liabilities –9.2 2.6 –47.2
$VVHWV 12.8 –1.1 37.2
Other sectors (without cash 
foreign currency)
–10.3 0.1 –41.2
Direct investment –6.5 –4.9 –6.0
Liabilities 1.2 5.8 –18.0
$VVHWV –7.7 –10.7 12.0
Loans –3.8 5.0 –35.2
Liabilities –3.8 5.0 –35.2
Cash foreign currency 1.4 –7.6 –8.0
Total –8.4 –4.3 –71.6
Liabilities –14.9 5.1 –112.8




to the banking sector, 18% to the reduction in public sector liabilities and 54% to 
WKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRU7KXVWKHDFWXDOUHGXFWLRQLQIRUHLJQFDSLWDOLQÀRZKDVIDU
exceeded the direct effects of the lending restrictions on public banks and companies.
7KHUHGXFWLRQVLQIRUHLJQFDSLWDO LQÀRZZHUHSDUWO\RIIVHWLHE\E\
DGHFUHDVHLQWKHRXWÀRZRIFDSLWDOPDLQO\IURPWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU:HHVWLPD
ted the net effect of the sanctions for 2014 as a whole (after taking into account 
WKHDFWLRQVRIEXVLQHVVHVDVDQDFFHOHUDWHGFDSLWDORXWÀRZRI86'ELOOLRQLQ
annual terms (6.2% of the GDP). 
7KHHVWLPDWHVDUHVOLJKWO\ORZHUIRUWKHVDQFWLRQ\HDUDV7DEOHVKRZV+RZHYHU
this result is largely explained by methodological factors: as noted above, the down-
JUDGLQJRI5XVVLD¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJGXULQJWKH¿UVWTXDUWHURIDQGWKHRYHUVKRRW-
LQJRIWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHGXULQJWKHIRXUWKTXDUWHURIPDNHLWGLI¿FXOWWRHV-
timate the effects of the sanctions on “public sector liabilities” and “cash foreign 
FXUUHQF\´GXULQJWKH¿UVWKDOIRI7KHHVWLPDWHVSURYLGHGIRUWKHPLQ7DEOH
only correspond to the second half of 2014, which is why the data in Table 4 can 
be understood on the whole as the minimum estimate for the impact of the sanc-
WLRQV7KXVWKHGHFUHDVHLQWKHIRUHLJQFDSLWDOLQÀRZZDV86'ELOOLRQGXU-
LQJ WKHVDQFWLRQ\HDUZKLFK HTXDOV RI*'3$SSUR[LPDWHO\RI
this reduction is attributable to the banking sector, 11% to the drop in public sector 
OLDELOLWLHVDQGWRWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRU7KHRIIVHWWKURXJKGHFUHDVHGFDSL-
WDORXWÀRZJUHZRYHUWLPHDQGUHDFKHGRQDYHUDJHGXULQJWKHVDQFWLRQ\HDU
The net effect of the sanctions (including reactions by Russian investors) is esti-
PDWHGDVDQDFFHOHUDWHGQHWFDSLWDORXWÀRZRI86'ELOOLRQRI*'3
4. Evaluation of the sanctions’ effects in the medium-term
7KHDERYHPRGHOVRIWKH¿QDQFLDODFFRXQWFRPSRQHQWVGHSHQGRQH[RJHQRXV
(oil prices) and internal (GDP dynamics) factors that, in turn, depend on oil prices 
and sanctions. Therefore, estimates of the medium-term impact of the sanctions 




We considered several combinations of oil price dynamics and the effects of 











1 % %DVHOLQHZLWKRXWVDQFWLRQV ²² No
2 %6 %DVHOLQHZLWKVDQFWLRQV ²² Yes
3 S Shock without sanctions ²² No
4 SS Shock with sanctions ²² Yes
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The baseline scenario corresponds to the hypothetical version in which oil prices 






DFRPSDULVRQRI WKHLQGLFDWRUV LQ WKH6DQG%66DQG%6 VFHQDULRV\LHOGVHVWL-
mates for the effect of falling oil prices without and with the sanctions.
%HORZZHOLVWWKHRWKHUDVVXPSWLRQVXVHGLQIRUPXODWLQJWKHVFHQDULRV
x $OO¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVDUHHIIHFWLYHWKURXJKRXWWKHIRUHFDVWSHULRG:HFDQQRW
rule out the possibility that they (particularly those imposed by the EU) will be 
OLIWHGVRRQHU+RZHYHULWLVLPSRUWDQWWRXQGHUVWDQGKRZORQJWKHLUHIIHFWZLOO
extend if they remain. 
x )RUWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRULQDOOVFHQDULRVZHDVVXPHGGHRIIVKRULQJZKHWKHU
resulting from the sanctions or from anti-offshore government policies): accu-
mulation of other assets is not 9.6% of export revenues (as it was in 2010 through 
EXWRQO\ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHDYHUDJHYDOXHIRUWKHWKLUGTXDU-
WHURIDQGWKH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGTXDUWHUVRI 
x ,Q WHUPVRI¿VFDOSROLF\ZHDVVXPHG WKDW WKHH[SHQGLWXUHV LQ WKH%DQG%6
scenarios are consistent with the initial version of the budget for 2015 through 
2017, as adopted in December 2014;7 for the S and SS scenarios, the 2015 
H[SHQGLWXUHV DUH WDNHQ IURP WKHPRGL¿HG YHUVLRQ DGRSWHG LQ$SULO 8 
DQG¿QDOO\IRUDQGWKH\DUHWDNHQIURPWKHEXGJHWELOOIRU
through 2018.9 The same assumptions concern the changes in the volumes of 
the Reserve Fund. 
x $OWKRXJKWKH*XLGHOLQHVIRUWKH6LQJOH6WDWH0RQHWDU\3ROLF\LQDQGIRU
2016 and 201710 LQGLFDWH WKDW WKH%DQNRI5XVVLD VKRXOG HQJDJH LQ IRUHLJQ
exchange interventions in response to increases or expenditures of the Reserve 




not making foreign exchange interventions in response to transactions involv-
ing Russia’s sovereign wealth funds. 
x $QXPEHU RI H[SHUWV H[SUHVVHG WKHRSLQLRQ WKDW WKHVDQFWLRQV LPSRVHG RQ
Russia encouraged a “preventive” reduction in the foreign debt, while other 
countries only faced a sharp deterioration in foreign borrowing conditions in 
2015, against the backdrop of an expected increase in the U.S. Federal Funds 
rate (in terms of the scenarios considered, this would have meant an “addition” 




 8 KWWSZZZPLQ¿QUXUXGRFXPHQW"LGB 




some extent in 2016 and 2017.




ODU LQGLFDWRUVPD\EHGLIIHUHQW+RZHYHUZHFRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKHPDJQLWXGHRI
the impact (determined by comparing the scenarios) seemed plausible.
The EEG model on which the calculations are based is built upon econometric 
(including cointegrating) estimates of the relationships between the basic macro-
HFRQRPLFDQG¿VFDOYDULDEOHVIURPWKURXJKDQGWKHPDFURHFRQRPLF




USD 160–170 billion over the period under review. Table 10 shows that these losses 
are approximately 2.5 times lower than the total losses from decreasing oil prices 
(by the end of the period, the losses from low oil prices are 4 times higher than 
WKHORVVHVIURPVDQFWLRQVDOWKRXJKWKHORVVHVIRUWKHFXUUHQWDFFRXQWDQG¿QDQFLDO




 + 2015 2016 2017 Total for 
2014–2017
*URVVFDSLWDOLQÀRZWRWDO –69.0 –84.8 –57.9 –64.3 –276.0
Debt liabilities –39.0 –67.3 –33.8 –44.0 –184.1
Foreign direct investment –17.6 –17.5 –24.1 –20.3 –79.5
General government liabilities –12.4 – – – –12.4
*URVVFDSLWDORXWÀRZ –10.6 –46.2 –26.4 –31.1 –114.3
Net effect from the sanctions –58.4 –38.6 –31.5 –33.2 –161.7
For reference: net effect from 
the sanctions as a percentage of GDP




 + 2015 2016 2017 Total for 
2014–2017
*URVVFDSLWDOLQÀRZWRWDO –68.8 –89.4 –58.0 –65.3 –281.5
Debt liabilities –39.0 –67.3 –33.8 –44.0 –184.1
Foreign direct investment –17.6 –22.1 –24.2 –21.3 –85.2
General government liabilities –12.4 – – – –12.4
*URVVFDSLWDORXWÀRZ –10.6 –45.6 –26.1 –30.9 –113.2
Net effect from the sanctions –58.2 –43.8 –31.7 –34.4 –168.1
For reference: net effect from 
the sanctions as a percentage of GDP
–2.9 –3.3 –2.4 –2.4 –2.8
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direct effects (through borrowing by banks and companies affected by the sanctions) 




JLYHQ ORZRLOSULFHV LQ WKHVFHQDULRZLWK VDQFWLRQVJURVV¿[HGFDSLWDO LQYHVW-
ment is, on average, 3.5% lower than in the scenario without sanctions from 2014 
through 2017, while retail sales turnover is 2.6% lower (these calculations, in 
accordance with the estimates earlier obtained by the Economic Expert Group, 
DVVXPHD¿VFDOPXOWLSOLHUYDOXHRI+RZHYHU WKHLPSDFWRI WKHVDQFWLRQV
RQLQYHVWPHQWJURZWKUDWHVLVPRVWO\OLPLWHGWRDQG$V)LJVKRZV
falling oil prices have a more profound impact on investment (mainly due to pro-
GXFHUV¶UHGXFHGSUR¿WVZKLFKDUHWKHPDLQVRXUFHRIVDYLQJV,QYHVWPHQWGURSV
PRVWVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQDOWKRXJKE\WKHLPSDFWRIFKHDSRLOLVSUDFWLFDOO\
eliminated. The comparison of investment forecasts as of the end of the period in 
TXHVWLRQIRUHDFKVFHQDULRFKDUDFWHUL]LQJWKHDFFXPXODWHGHIIHFWVRIH[RJHQRXV
shocks) demonstrates that the sanctions reduced investment by 5% on the whole 
throughout the period, whereas falling oil prices reduced investment by 24%.
7KHLQFUHDVHGFDSLWDORXWÀRZQDWXUDOO\DQGSUHGLFWDEO\EULQJVGRZQWKHUXEOHH[-
change rate (see Fig. 12). Thus, according to our estimates, the sanctions increased 




2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
&KDQJHVLQQHWFDSLWDOLQÀRZDVDUHVXOWRI
the sanctions
–58 –44 –32 –34 –168
2LODQGJDVH[SRUWYDOXH 0 –122 –141 –135 –398
Note: 7KLVDQGVXEVHTXHQWWDEOHVDQG¿JXUHVVKRZWKHHIIHFWVIURPWKHVDQFWLRQVXQOHVVRWKHUZLVHVWDWHGDW
low oil prices and the effects from falling oil prices with sanctions.
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the exchange rate of the USD by approximately 6 rubles in 2015. This effect declines 
RYHUWLPHDVJUHDWHURXWÀRZRIFDSLWDOLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKLPSURYHGQHWIRUHLJQDVVHWV
and, accordingly, improved balance of investment income (thus, by 2017, the impact 
of the sanctions on the annual average USD rate is estimated at as low as 2 rubles). 
$ ZHDNHU UXEOH SURYLGHV FHUWDLQ VXSSRUW WR QHW H[SRUWV WKXV WKHLPSRUWV LQ
WKH%6 VFHQDULR LQ  WKURXJK  DUH RQ DYHUDJH ORZHU WKDQ LQ WKHEDVH-
OLQH VFHQDULR %E\ZKHUHDV LQ WKH66VFHQDULR WKH\DUH ORZHU WKDQ
in the shock scenario (S). Nevertheless, the effects from reduced domestic demand 
prevail, as expected, and the GDP in scenarios without the sanctions is higher than in 
scenarios with the sanctions (see Fig. 13). Notably, the effect of both shocks remains 
VLJQL¿FDQW WKURXJKRXW WKHSHULRGXQGHU UHYLHZDW±SS IRU WKHVDQFWLRQVDQG
–1.1 p.p. for falling oil prices). GDP losses that have accumulated over the period 
DPRXQWWRIRUWKH¿UVWVKRFNDQGIRUWKHVHFRQGVKRFN7KXVWKHDQQXDO
DYHUDJHHVWLPDWHG*'3ORVVHVGXHWRWKH¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQV±SSDUHFORVH
to the results obtained by Sinyakov et al. (2015) (0.5–0.6 p.p.) and, to the best of 
our judgment, are lower than the vaguely formulated IMF estimates (according to 
which, the effect would “initially” be 1.0–1.5 p.p. and 9 p.p. “in the medium-term”).
It should be noted that the considerable decrease in GDP in response to falling 
RLOSULFHVUHÀHFWVWKH³SDVVLYH´DGMXVWPHQWWRVXFKVKRFNVSUHYDLOLQJLQWKH5XVVLDQ
economy. The real depreciation of the ruble due to deteriorating terms of trade 
only slightly increased the volume of exports (because they are dominated by 
Fig. 12.$QQXDODYHUDJH86'UDWHXQGHUGLIIHUHQWVFHQDULRV58%86'
Fig 13. Impact of shocks on (a) GDP growth (p.p.) and (b) GDP volume (%).
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oil and gas exports which are not particularly sensitive to the exchange rate) (see 
*XUYLFK3ULOHSVNL\7KHORZHUUHDOH[FKDQJHUDWHGRHVQRWKDYHDVLJQL¿-
cant effect on the supply of tradable domestic goods to the domestic market (see 
%ODQNHWDO7KXV WKHPDLQUHDFWLRQWRIDOOLQJRLOSULFHVZDVGHFUHDVHG
production of non-tradable goods resulting from falling domestic demand.
6FHQDULRVZLWKVDQFWLRQVDUHDOVRFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\KLJKHULQÀDWLRQVHH)LJ
ZKLFKLVUHODWHGWRWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHIRRGHPEDUJRWKHHIIHFWRIZKLFKDF-
cording to estimates by E. Gurvich et al. (2014), was 1.2 p.p. in 2014 and 0.8 p.p. 
LQDQGWRWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHSDVVWKURXJK+RZHYHUWKHDGGLWLRQDOFRQWUDF-
WLRQ LQ GRPHVWLF GHPDQGXQGHU WKHVFHQDULRVZLWK VDQFWLRQV UHVWUDLQV LQÀDWLRQ
WRDFHUWDLQH[WHQW7KHLPSDFWRIERWKVKRFNVRQLQÀDWLRQLVPRVWO\FRQ¿QHGWR
2014 and 2015, whereas the combined effect on consumer prices is estimated 
at approximately 4% for the sanctions and 8% for falling oil prices. Comparing 
the accumulated growth of CPI for 2014 through 2017 reveals that the sanctions 
add 5.7 p.p. to it, whereas falling oil prices add 11.0 p.p. 
$ZHDNHU UXEOH DQG KLJKHU LQÀDWLRQ XQGHU WKHVFHQDULRVZLWK WKH VDQFWLRQV
SURYLGHVXEVWDQWLDOVXSSRUWIRU¿VFDOUHYHQXHV LQQRPLQDO WHUPVZKLFKDUHQR
OHVV LPSRUWDQW IRU WKHJRYHUQPHQW WKDQ UHDO UHYHQXHV LQ WKH¿UVW DQG VHFRQG





In other words, we are facing a paradox: ,QWKHLULQLWLDO\HDUVWKH¿QDQFLDOVDQF-
tions help the government overcome possibly the most painful consequences of 
IDOOLQJRLOSULFHV LH WKHVKDUSUHGXFWLRQ LQ¿VFDO UHYHQXHV, whose real value 
falls by almost 20% over two years, mainly due to cheaper oil.
%HFDXVHWKH%DQNRI5XVVLDZLOOQRWLQWHUYHQHLQWKH);PDUNHWIURP
through 2017, based on the assumptions above, adjusting the balance of pay-
PHQWV WR WKHLQFUHDVH LQ WKHQHW FDSLWDO RXWÀRZ FDXVHG E\ WKHVDQFWLRQV ERLOV
down to a mirroring increase in the current account. It consists of three main 
components: increased exports due to the stimulating effects of the weaker  ruble; 
lower imports (also due to the overall contraction of domestic demand); and im-
proved balance of investment income. The results presented in Table 11 showing 
the relative contribution of these components (i.e., comparing scenarios with 
ERWKKLJKDQGORZRLOSULFHVFRQ¿UPWKHSRLQWSURYHQSUHYLRXVO\VHH*XUYLFK
and Prilepskiy, 2013) that imports play a considerably more important role in 
adjusting to external shocks than exports (the so-called “internal” mechanism 
RI DGMXVWPHQWSUHYDLOV RYHU WKH³H[WHUQDO´PHFKDQLVP7DEOH DOVR UHÀHFWV
the fact noted above that investment income improves over time under those 
scenarios with the sanctions.
%\ DGMXVWPHQW LQ WKHSULPDU\ DQG VHFRQGDU\ LQFRPHEDODQFHV DOPRVW
completely neutralizes the sanctions’ impact on the real exchange rate (see 
7DEOH2QWKHRQHKDQGWKLV¿QGLQJUHÀHFWVWKHJHQHUDOUHVXOWRIWKHFDOFXOD-
Table 11 
Components of the relative increase in the current account under scenarios with sanctions.
2015 2016 2017
+LJKRLOSULFHV±86'ELOOLRQ 38.6 31.5 33.2
including (%)
Exports of goods and services 10.9 6.2 4.3
Imports of goods and services 60.8 39.5 32.1
%DODQFHRISULPDU\DQGVHFRQGDU\LQFRPH 28.3 54.3 63.6
Low oil prices (4–3), USD billion 43.8 31.7 34.4
including (%)
Exports of goods and services 12.4 7.2 4.7
Imports of goods and services 47.3 39.4 36.5




Variable/shock Sanctions Falling oil prices








Fixed capital investment –3.2 –5.0 –22.6 –24.1
Retail sales turnover –2.4 –3.7 –17.1 –18.2
GDP volume –1.5 –2.4 –7.1 –8.0
Consumer prices at the end of the period 3.1 4.1 7.1 8.1
Real ruble exchange rate against the USD –0.5 –0.3 26.9 –26.8
1RPLQDO¿VFDOUHYHQXHV 1.1 1.2 –13.1 –13.0
5HDO¿VFDOUHYHQXHV –1.2 –2.0 –18.9 –19.5
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tions, i.e., that the medium-term effects of the sanction shock are weaker than 
WKRVH RI WKHRLO SULFH VKRFN2Q WKHRWKHU KDQG LWPHDQV WKDW WKHFRPSDUDWLYH
GDP gain from the dynamics of net exports in scenarios with the sanctions will 
also be close to zero by 2017, and over the longer term, low oil prices are a sig-
QL¿FDQWO\PRUHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRULQLQFUHDVLQJH[WHUQDOFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQGHQ-
couraging import substitution than the sanctions.
$V QRWHG DERYH WKHHIIHFW RI WKH¿QDQFLDO VDQFWLRQV RQ QHW FDSLWDO LQÀRZ
GRHVQRWGHSHQGRQRLOSULFHV+RZHYHUFRPSDULQJPDFURHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUV
XQGHUGLIIHUHQWVFHQDULRVVKRZVWKDWWKHVDQFWLRQVKDYHDVLJQL¿FDQWO\VWURQJHU
impact on economic development at low oil prices than at high oil prices (see 
Table 12). Similarly, the sanctions aggravate the impact of falling oil prices 
on the economy. This “synergy” emerges because similar reductions (in USD 
WHUPVLQFDSLWDOLQÀRZLQWKHVFHQDULRZLWKORZRLOSULFHVEHFRPHFRQVLGHUDEO\
larger as a percentage of the GDP components (investment, consumption, etc.), 




tions, we draw several conclusions. 
x $VLGH IURP WKHLUGLUHFWHIIHFWV LH OLPLWHG IRUHLJQERUURZLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHV
for banks and companies in the fuel and energy and military-industrial sectors 
WKDWDUHSXEOLFO\KHOGWKH¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVhave considerable indirect effects 
on the Russian economy in the form of decreasing foreign direct investment, 
fewer borrowing opportunities for companies and banks not directly targeted 
E\ WKHVDQFWLRQV DQG ORZHU FDSLWDO LQÀRZ LQWR WKHJRYHUQPHQW GHEWPDUNHW
These indirect effects roughly triple the direct effects of the sanctions. 
x The consequences of the sanctions are to a large extent (by approximately 40%) 
RIIVHWE\GHFUHDVHG5XVVLDQFDSLWDORXWÀRZ$VDUHVXOWWKHWRWDODGGLWLRQDOQHW
FDSLWDORXWÀRZUHODWHGWRWKHVDQFWLRQVFDQEHHVWLPDWHGDW86'ELOOLRQLQ
2014 and USD 160–170 billion over the period from 2014 through 2017. 
x 7KHVDQFWLRQVDJDLQVW5XVVLDDUHTXLWHSDLQIXO IRUreal sector indicators: by 
DFFRXQWLQJIRUWKHLU¿QDQFLDOFRPSRQHQWDORQHZLOO\LHOGORVVHVRI
of pre-crisis GDP by 2017 (when oil prices are approximately USD 50 per 
 barrel), with a simultaneous reduction in investment and consumption. 
x Nevertheless, the drop in oil prices had a much larger effect on the Russian 
economy. Indeed, according to our estimates, the drop in prices leads to GDP 
losses of 8.5 p.p. cumulatively from 2014 through 2017. 
x 7KHGLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKHHIIHFWV RI WKHWZR VKRFNV RQ ¿VFDO UHYHQXHV LV
particularly large. $OWKRXJK WKHIDOO LQRLOSULFHVGHFUHDVHV WKHLU UHDOYDOXH
E\ ±E\ ± WKHVDQFWLRQV GHFUHDVH WKHP LQVLJQL¿FDQWO\ E\
1–2%). Moreover, at the beginning of the period, government revenues even 
grow in real terms. 
x 7KHFRPSDUDWLYHO\ OLPLWHG HIIHFW RI WKH¿QDQFLDO VDQFWLRQV FRPSDUHG ZLWK
the fall in oil prices LVODUJHO\H[SODLQHGE\WKHDFWLYHVHOIDGMXVWPHQWLQWKH¿UVW
FDVHLQSDUWLFXODUWKURXJKUHGXFHGFDSLWDORXWÀRZIURP5XVVLDZKHUHDVLQ




particular, when speaking of real sector indicators, i.e., GDP, investment and re-
tail sales, the effect of the sanctions has been increased by more than 50%. 
x +RZHYHUZH VKRXOG QRWH WKHconsiderable ability of the Russian economy to 
DGMXVWDVDUHVXOWRIWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPH$FFRUGLQJ
WRRXUFDOFXODWLRQVWKHWRWDOQHWFDSLWDOLQÀRZORVVHVGXHWRWKHVDQFWLRQVIURP
2014 through 2017 will amount to 8% of 2013 GDP (with low oil prices), where-
as the accumulated GDP losses (the total difference in output between the S and 
SS scenarios from 2014 through 2017) are estimated at 6 p.p. of 2013 GDP. 
$FNQRZOHGJHPHQWV
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